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An Overview of the Political
and Security Dialogue until
2002
The basis of the structured relations
between the European Union (EU) and
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) started with a political dialogue
at the level of Foreign Ministers in 1978
and a cooperation agreement signed in
1980. ASEAN is thus the EU’s oldest
regional dialogue partner. Economically,
ASEAN with its ten member countries has
meanwhile become EU’s second-largest
sales market and third-largest trading
partner in Asia (after Japan and China),
whilst the EU is the second-largest investor
in ASEAN and its third-largest trading
partner (accounting for 14% of ASEAN’s
trade) after the United States (16.5%) and
Japan (16%). In 2002, EU exports to
ASEAN – with its combined Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of 656 billion
Euros, a total population of 532 million
people and accounting for 27% of world
GDP – were estimated at 61 billion Euros,
while EU imports from ASEAN were
valued at 42 billion Euros. The EU-ASEAN
trade represented 5.1% of total world
trade.2 But the proportion of the total
amount of EU Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) received by ASEAN has steadily
declined from 3.3% in 1998 to 2.6% in
1999, 1.6% in 2000 and 1.8% in 2001,
reflecting that other emerging markets
(such as China) have become more
attractive as destinations for EU
investments. At the beginning of the 1990s,
Southeast Asia acquired 61% of all EU-
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“… our dialogue with ASEAN and its member countries should help identify areas
where ASEAN and the EU can work together on global security questions, and on
global challenges such as drugs and transnational crime. We should continue to give
full support to conflict prevention efforts within the region…, and to civil society efforts
to promote transparency, good governance and the rule of law. And in our political
dialogue with ASEAN and its member countries we should give attention to human
rights issues.”1
MAIN TOPICS
EU-ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the Beginning of the 21 Century:
Prospects for Interregional Cooperation on International Terrorism
FDI flows to entire Asia. Ten years later,
it is China that is accumulating 61% of
all EU-FDI that go to Asia, whereas the
ASEAN states receive only 10%.
More positive progress has been made
on the political level. Both sides have
strengthened and deepened their
interregional cooperation, and particularly
their security dialogue when the EU has
become a full member of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) as the “Track-One”
(government dialogue) forum and the
Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-
Pacific (CSCAP) as the supporting ”Track-
Two” institution (involving Academic
experts and government officials in ”private
capacity“) in 1993/94. In 1996, both sides
established in addition the Asia-Europe-
Meeting (ASEM) process, supported by
the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation
(CAEC) as the ”Track-Two” institution.
Since the second half of the 1990s, the
EU also supported the democratic
government transition in Cambodia and
East Timor, helped to finance the Korean
Energy Development Organisation
(KEDO) for de-nuclearising North Korea
and has supported the refugee flows in
and from Afghanistan.3
In reality, however, all these multilateral
dialogue frameworks and even the ARF
have only slowly developed a shared
understanding of basic concepts and the
needed habits as well as customs of close
multilateral political and security
consultation. Moreover, all security
discussions in the ARF have focused
hitherto primarily on threat perceptions
and confidence-building measures rather
than on concrete management of regional
security conflicts and conflict resolution
mechanisms involving legal obligations
and not just non-binding political
declarations. Even more concrete initiatives
in this direction within track-two processes
and their constrained security agendas
have not been transformed entirely into
formal govern-mental ones due to key
countries and their unwillingness or
hesitance to do so. Furthermore, although
those new forms of multilateral security
cooperation have enhanced state-to-state
relations, state building, and created
“epistemic communities” (networks of
experts) within the region as well as beyond
with the United States (US) and Europe,
they have not significantly con-tri-bu-ted
to the creation of wider civil societies,
neither at the domestic nor regional level.
With the waves of the Asian crisis of 1997-
98 and the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001, and its impact on Asia, European
politicians and the public have begun to
recognise that despite the geographical
and psychological distance of many local
and regional conflicts from Europe, they
have and will have direct or at least indirect
impacts on Europe’s future economic and
political stability. That is one of the reasons
why Germany’s foreign and security
policies has become increasingly globalised
during the last decade. Thus regional
security developments in Asia are now
becoming much more important for the
European foreign and security policy, as
it is admitted, for instance, in the new
sub-regional Southeast Asia concept paper
of the German foreign ministry, published
in May 2002: “Regional and security
developments in Asia are now having a
greater impact on European foreign and
security policy.”4
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A Comparison of the Major
EU-Asia Concept Papers
1994-2003 – A Comment
If one looks back and compares the
various regional and sub-regional concept
papers of the EU and its member states
since 1994, when the EU published its
first comprehensive “Asia concept” paper,
the European Commission has already
admitted before September 11, 2001 that
the growing interregional trade between
Europe and Asia is becoming increasingly
dependent on the future national and
regional political-economic stability in
East Asia. The new EU-Asia concept paper
of September 2001, for instance, reflects
a much better balance between the EU’s
economic and political strategic interests
in East Asia and Southeast Asia. The field
of political and security dialogue is
mentioned even at the first place ahead of
our economic cooperation, though the
real implemented policies very often differ
from the concept paper due to the lack of
political coherence of the different national
European foreign and security policies vis-
à-vis Asia as well as the political
unwillingness of the EU member states to
implement a real Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP).5 Nonetheless,
these concept papers determine the
direction of the future development of the
EU-policies in Asia. The EU-Asia strategy
paper of September 2001, for instance,
has demanded:
“The EU should play a more active role
in regional fora, support conflict
prevention by sharing common experiences
and enhance EU-Asia dialogue in the
realm of justice and home affairs. This
will include areas such as asylum,
immigration and arms trafficking
amongst others.”6
Therefore, the paper has called for
broadening and deepening of the EU’s
engagement policies with the Asia-Pacific
region that reflects its growing global
security interests. The EU’s new
“Comprehensive Strategy for Future
Relations with Southeast Asia” of July 2003
has gone even further and has specified
the European security interests in Southeast
Asia in the light of the new security
challenges arising since September 2001
in the following areas:
supporting regional stability and the
fight against international terrorism;
continuing support actions in the area
of conflict prevention and conflict
settlement;
deepening and intensifying cooperation
on the multilateral and bilateral basis
on new agendas such as human rights
(moving even at the top of the agenda
of “new priorities”), good governance,
justice and home affairs issues and
fighting against international terrorism
as part of a “comprehensive security
concept” that reflect a wider security
understanding in the post-Cold War
era.7
As Chris Patten, the EU’s External
Relations Commissioner, has pointed out:
“We are not only major trading partners,
but partners in the fight against terrorism,
organised crime, and drug trade”.8 In this
light, the EU has declared its willingness
to assist countries taking measures against
international terrorism without prejudice
to the respect by the countries concerned
of basic human rights principles and
peaceful political opposition. In this
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context, the EU’s proclaimed strategic
interest in cooperation in the field of energy
security should also address, in the future,
the field of supply security. Energy security
and the projected growth in energy demand
in Southeast Asia are also directly linked
with maritime security and related security
challenges such as piracy, terrorist attacks
on ships and smuggling of migrants as well
as illicit traffic in drugs and arms, especially
in Southeast Asia such as the Straits of
Malacca. Two-thirds of the global shipping
trade (including Europe’s) runs through
these choke-points of the Sea Lane of
Communications (SLOCs) in Southeast
Asia. The number of terrorist and pirate
attacks against ships in the open seas has
risen sharply during the last decade. In
2000, this number increased by not less
than 40% in comparison with the year
before. The most well-known examples of
piracy and terrorist attacks on international
shipping during the last few years were the
brutal attack of American destroyer USS
Cole by Al-Qaeda terrorists in the port of
Yemen-Aden in 2000 – killing 17 people
and wounding 42, whilst the ship suffered
severe damage – and the attack on the
French oil tanker Limburg off Yemen in
2001.
This incident was soon followed by a
number of similar attacks against ships
from other countries, mostly in Southeast
Asia. The shipping traffic and particularly
the container trade is strategically
important for the Asia-Pacific region in
general and Southeast Asia in particular,
given that five of the “top six” container
ports in the world are now all in East Asia
(with Hong Kong and Singapore by far
the biggest “megaports” in the world).
Thus Northeast Asian countries such as
People’s Republic of China, Japan and
South Korea are also heavily dependent
on stable oil imports and secure SLOCs
from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf
to  Eas t  As i a .  Only  the  jo in t
implementation of regional maritime
security strategies and multilateral
cooperation are able and effective for
countering these increasing regional
threats.9 Given the strategic importance
of energy and the geo-strategic key position
of the ASEAN countries in the supply
(Indonesia is presently the largest Liquefied
Natural Gas [LNG] exporter in the world)
and/or transport, the EU has also proposed
a strategic dialogue and further cooperation
in the fields of co-generation and renewable
energies in its newest Southeast Asia
Strategy paper of 2003.10
Future Cooperation Fields
In June 2003, the EU has adopted three
new major documents on the EU’s CFSP:
a) a first-ever global EU foreign and
security concept paper, which will
be adopted at the end of the year,
also called “Solana paper” (officially
named: “A Secure Europe in a Better
World”)11;
b) a declaration on non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), officially called: “Basic
Principles for an EU-Strategy against
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction”.12 This paper has also
led to a joint EU-US statement to
avert WMD on June 25, 200313;
c) a declaration on Iran which indicates
a fundamental change in the EU’s
Iran-policy in the light Teheran’s
nuclear weapons ambitions and the
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new importance of the EU’s non-
proliferation policies.14
On the Solana Strategy Paper
of June 2003:
This highly important document is
serving as the basis for an officially declared
“European Security Strategy” to be adopted
by the European Council in December
2003. The new strategy is calling explicitly
for extending the zone of security around
Europe and to develop “strategic
partnerships” not just with the US, Canada,
and Japan, but also with China and India
due to their important role “in their
respective regions and beyond”.
Even in a US view, this paper is seen
as a remarkable document in many ways:
it is “jargon- free, oriented to substance
rather than process, and modestly self-
confident rather than self-congratulatory”.
It characterises the transatlantic relationship
as “irreplaceable” and calls for strengthened
US-EU ties to cope with the new and even
more dangerous security challenges outside
of Europe. The paper outlines basically
three new major security threats to the
EU: (1) international terrorism; (2)
proliferation of WMD; and (3) failed states
and organised crime. In contrast to some
of the new security declarations of the
Bush Administration, however, the paper
also calls for extending the zone of security
around Europe by emphasising the
instruments of multilateralism and respect
for international law that includes also
East Asia and Southeast Asia.
But even more important is the notion
that the strategy paper calls for directly
countering the new security threats. The
strategy paper interprets some of those
threats as being so dangerous and dynamic
that they require reaction before the crises
arise (pre-emption/preventive action). But
it emphasises on the context of diplomatic
crisis prevention so that the need for
military action will not arise (as we have
seen in October 2003 when the French,
German and British foreign ministers
visited Teheran with some success in order
to persuade Iran’s government not to opt
for a nuclear weapons capability). But the
paper is also indicating that the door for
pre-emptive military action has cautiously
and partially been opened or is at least not
totally excluded any longer, dependent on
the characterisation of the concrete threat.
Therewith, the EU’s CFSP and its
European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) are moving closer to some
controversial US-positions in this regard.15
 On the Declaration on Non-Proliferation
of WMD
Against the background of the Solana
paper, the Declaration on Non-
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction for the first time declares, as
a key policy objective of the EU’s CFSP
and ESDP, “to deter, halt, and where
possible, reverse proliferation programmes
of concern world-wide.” In this context,
the strategy paper no longer even excludes
the political option of military action as a
“last resort” to prevent dangerous
developments of proliferation of WMD.
But in contrast to the US position of a
unilateral assessment and political decision,
the EU restricts this possibility to the need
of a legitimation by the UN Security
Council. However, this option is no longer
excluded per se as it was in the past, but
also in the future, where the primary
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European focus will still be based on
preventive diplomacies.
On the Iran Declaration in June 2003
The statement at the Thessaloniki-
summit of the EU in mid-June 2003 is
indicating a fundamental change of the
EU’s Iran policy. In the past, both the EU
as well its member states such as Germany
was prided to have a “critical dialogue”
with Teheran in the hope of strengthening
Iran’s moderate and reform-oriented
political forces. Now the EU is threatening
Teheran by suspending economic and
political ties. It does not even exclude
economic and other sanctions if Iran
weaponises its nuclear ambitions. This
change of the EU-policy towards Teheran
needs to be explained not so much by
Europe’s strategic interest and intention
to improve its relationship with
Washington, but rather in the recognition
that the EU and its member states have
underestimated the new security threats
such as the proliferation of WMD,
international terrorism (particularly linked
with WMD) in general and Iran’s political
will to develop and to deploy nuclear
weapons in particular. It may also mirror
the disappointment in the EU about the
critical dialogue with Iran and even been
misled by the disinformation of Teheran
during the last years. In a new report on
November 10, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) came to the
conclusion that the Iranian documents
turned over to the IAEA confirmed a clear
pattern of years of experimentation in
producing small amounts of materials that
could be fabricated into weapons, including
plutonium.
Although the report did not officially
confirm US’s accusation that Iran is using
its civilian nuclear programme as a cover
for its nuclear weapons programme, the
report has revealed how far and how long
(almost 18 years) a Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) signatory subject to IAEA-
inspections could be making nuclear
weapons while pretending to comply with
international inspections! Ultimately, the
value of the agreement with the three EU
foreign ministers to suspend (and not
“permanently end”) its uranium
enrichment and giving the UN free access
to all suspicious sites will depend not so
much on the communiqué, but on the
implementation of what has been agreed.16
Furthermore, it is not just Teheran but
also other Arab states that seek to acquire
WMD and long-ranging ballistic missiles
that may threaten Europe much earlier
than the United States. In a broader
context, if both present crises, namely to
Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapons
ambitions, cannot be solved diplomatically
and if both go ahead with the nuclear
weapons development, it might mean
nothing less than the end of the global
multilateral arms control regimes which
are already in a major crisis since India
and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles tests in 1998. It
particularly concerns the future of the
nuclear NPTs and the IAEA inspection
regimes as an independent UN watchdog
whose existence is especially important for
non-nuclear weapon countries in Europe
such as Germany. Moreover, if Iran will
develop and deploy nuclear weapons, other
Arab and Persian Gulf countries such as
Saudi Arabia will follow soon as some
recent statements from their side have
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already indicated. Hence an Iranian nuclear
weapon option would not only be
perceived in Israel as a deadly threat but
also in other neighbouring Arab countries
who distrust Teheran’s political aims for
historical and geo-strategic reasons.
Perspectives for Interregional
Anti-Terrorist Cooperation
between Europe and
Southeast Asia
“Archipelagic Southeast Asia is a relatively
comfortable operating theatre for the
terrorists compared with the Middle East
where the governments have been much
harsher on them. This is particularly so
in the case of Indonesia, in view of its
democratic space, weak governance, and
poor law enforcement.”17
“A franker recognition of these
[terrorist] problems is undoubtedly
growing at least at leadership level. But
ASEAN’s non-confrontational, consensus-
based approach to addressing multi-lateral
issues has never been conducive to tackling
urgent problems head-on. Certainly, on
the counterterrorist front none of these
vulnerabilities is likely to see much
improvement before the next major bomb
goes off.”18
The terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington D.C. in September 2001, in
Bali in October 2002 and the JW Mariott
Hotel in Jakarta in August 2002 tragically
demonstrated the new dimensions and the
global nature of the threat of international
terrorism. Those new dimensions are:
an increasing dominance of religiously
motivated terrorism,
a geographic shift away from Europe
and Latin America to Northern Africa,
the Middle East, South Asia and
Southeast Asia,
the increasing global nature of
international terrorism,
escalating warfare strategies, which
might make use even of weapons of
mass destruction;
inseparability of internal and external
security of states being potential targets;
new networks with internationally
organised crime and making use of
weak and failed states as operational
bases;
increasing relevance of  non-state actors;
hybrid terrorist-criminal groups as the
result of convergence of terrorist groups
and organised crime.19
As the bombing in Bali and the
Philippines in the autumn of 2002 have
shown, Southeast Asia has become a new
focal point in international terrorism that
threatens the future of tourism and other
important industries in the region during
already difficult economic times. Southeast
Asia has become both a main refuge of
escape for Al-Qaeda members as well as a
land base for the reconstruction of various
loosely linked networks of regional Islamic
terrorist groups, aiming to build a pan-
Muslim state linking with Indonesia,
Malaysia and the southern parts of the
Philippines and Thailand.20 Recent events
have also highlighted a development that
locally inspired terrorist groups in moderate
Islamic countries in Southeast Asia (like
in Indonesia) have established links with
international terrorist groups (like Al-
Qaeda). They pose a direct threat not just
to these countries themselves but also to
neighbouring states as well as to the world
at large.
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Investigations and interrogations across
the region since September 2001 have
provided a contradicting picture. On one
hand, i t  offered a much better
understanding of the general threat posed
by international terrorist groups that were
virtually unknown before. According to
new analyses, for instance, the terrorist
network is much broader and more deeply
rooted than was previously assumed.
Reportedly, 400-600 Southeast Asians had
been trained by Al-Qaeda and its associated
terrorist groups in Afghanistan and
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, however,
despite many arrests in Southeast Asia, very
little is known even for terrorist experts
about the full extent of the loose networks
existing in the region. Furthermore, the
proliferation of man-portable air defence
missile systems (such as the Russian-made
Strela-2M) has raised particular concern in
the region and beyond. The greatest terrorist
risks exist in Indonesia and the Philippines,
and to a lesser extent, in Thailand.
Effective strategies for counter-terrorism
need not only include short-term measures
such as security and public order measures
but also long-term strategies which address
the complex and manifold root causes of
terrorism (poverty, low education, failing
pluralism and freedom of opinion etc). The
EU is seeing the fight against international
terrorism in a broader context that also
seeks to address issues like reducing poverty,
improving health and education as well as
i l legal migration and to support
programmes for the rule of law, practicing
good governance and democratic rule as
part of its traditional development assistance
to countries affected by terrorism.21 Special
attention must also be paid on international
cooperation against terrorist financing.
Those financial activities that support
terrorism include the use of individual
network nodes; narcotic and weapon sales;
kidnapping and ransom; charity use and
abuse; corporate vehicle manipulation;
financial benefactors, and the legitimate
banking system. As the investigation of the
attacks on September 11, 2001 has revealed:
“The 11 September cell funding flowed
unimpeded to the terrorists, without the
discovery of any assistance from corrupt
officials, patterns of suspicious transactions,
the flagging of large cash deposits, an
increased scrutiny of account activity
associated with high-risk countries or
effective due diligence mechanisms for
corresponding banking.”22
Meanwhile, some important steps for
an enhanced interregional cooperation
between the EU and ASEAN have been
taken. The 14th EU-ASEAN Meeting
between the foreign ministers of the EU
and ASEAN have adopted in January 2003
a “Joint Declaration on Cooperation to
Combat Terrorism”, while the ASEM-4
summit in September 2002 adopted a
declaration and action plan on the fight
against terrorism. Both sides are also
working closely together in the framework
of the ARF on counter-terrorism. The
European Commission has provided
financial assistance under its EC Rapid
Reaction Mechanism to the Philippines in
the fields of border management and money
laundering, and has supported Indonesia
to improve its judicial capacity building
and its fight against the financing of
terrorism. Malaysia might be offered
financial support for establishing the
“Counter Terrorism Centre” in its country.23
Until summer 2003, the EU has been
supporting counter-terrorist measures in
Southeast Asia with a total of 21 million
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Euros. ASEAN also signed with the US a
“Joint Declaration on Cooperation in
Striking Terrorism” on August 1, 2002 to
share intelligence, to prevent fund-raising,
to prevent transnational cooperation and
to draw up strict regulations for falsified
documents of terrorists. In order to maintain
a sustained global war against the
international terrorism, the US, the EU
and Asia must support regional and
interregional counter-terrorism strategies
instead of focusing on unilateral strategies
and unstable coalitions of the willing.
In Asia itself, the arrest of Al-Qaeda
terrorists or those linked with Jemaah
Islamiah in Singapore and other ASEAN
states have signalled that terrorism is a
regional and not just a national security
problem, affecting the entire region and
even beyond. In this light, global security
challenges such as international terrorism
require regional and global strategies to
cope with these new security threats. On a
more basic level, extremism in Southeast
Asia is centred primarily on debates within
the Muslim communities of the region.
Hence any strategy designed to counter
terrorist threats must also address
understandable concerns that those anti-
terrorist strategies could upset social and
political domestic stability and thus cause
even more regional instabil ity.24
Inappropriate state anti-terrorist responses
and an excessive use of military force against
the civilian population, and general political
as well as administrative ineptitude can
therefore, at the end, greatly support the
terrorists’ aims and ultimately undermine
the counter-terrorist strategies.
Although regional security cooperation
has made important progress, it seems more
than questionable whether the present
regional cooperation for countering terrorist
threat in Southeast Asia is adequate enough
to prevent further terrible attacks such as
those in Bali in 2002 for instance. This
does not mean that we should overlook
what has already been achieved. Initially, a
troika of the Philippines, Indonesia and
Malaysia has been formed for discussing
common policies in the face of extremist
threats in those countries. Broader
cooperation has increased, for instance,
between Indonesia and Malaysia, and first-
meetings of ASEAN’s military chiefs have
been held. Counter-terrorism is also high
on the agendas of the ARF25, CSCAP and
even Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) to improve intelligence sharing,
blocking terrorist funds and tightening
borders. The latest APEC meeting in
October, for instance, has produced an
agreed declaration of the group’s 21
countries “to dismantle, fully and without
delay, transnational terrorist groups” and
to “confront other direct threats to the
security of our region” as well as to
“eliminate the severe and growing danger
posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of
deliveries”.26 Those anti-terror measures
also included controls on portable, shoulder-
launched anti-aircraft missile systems.27
But ultimately these agreed regional
anti-terrorist cooperations seem still
insufficient in the context of effective
regional responses as well as in regard to
addressing the root causes of discontent
which is not just limited to poverty as
empirical studies of terrorism have already
revealed since the mid-1990s.
What are the problems for a closer
regional cooperation on international
terrorism in Southeast Asia? Like always,
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new funding is needed to build new
regional networks to address economic
disparity, good governance and human
rights while at the same time the region
needs to build an intelligence network
aimed at cutting off funds used by terrorist
groups. However, this need still seems
insufficiently implemented not just in
Southeast Asia, but also in the EU which
would have a significant positive global
impact on fighting international terrorism.
ASEAN states also still face difficulties
of arresting leaders in particular, and not
just mid- and low level members of Jemaah
Islamiah and Al-Qaeda. It illustrates the
inexperience and problems by the major
ASEAN states in dealing with these new
forms of international terrorism. Those
problems are compounded by the fact that
there is no specific overall security
institution in Asia that is comparable to
institutions such as Interpol or Europol.
Furthermore, these difficulties are
complicated by the fact that some countries
are heavily affected by terrorism such as
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
and the Philippines whereas others are
thus far only a potential target for terrorists
in the future. That explains the difficulty
in promoting joint regional agendas for
combating terrorism when not all the
grouping’s members are affected in the
same way by these new security challenges.
As past experiences also show, gathering
intelligence on the neighbouring countries
in which terrorist groups are located is
based on one’s own intelligence assets in
the neighbouring countries. The sharing
information can thus compromise their
own intelligence assets. Moreover, the
overall lack of a real regional strategy leads
to a situation in which each country looks
after its own territory and operations, and
passes on only selective intelligence
information to its neighbours. In general,
however, the ASEAN states have long
overlooked the activities of Islamic groups
like many European states too. The biggest
problem in Southeast Asia is, however, the
leadership vacuum in organising a joint
anti-terrorism strategy amongst members
being divided by to which extent they
should coordinate their efforts and
strategies closely with those of the United
States and other non-subregional powers.28
Symptomatic of the slow progress in
finding regional solutions to address
international terrorist threat is the creation
of the Southeast Asia Anti-Terror Centre
in Malaysia. Its idea has been promulgated
in early 2002. The centre has become
operational just in July 2003. Originally
it was planned as a joint US-Malaysian
initiative. But neither the military nor the
police have been involved in the centre
until today. It will focus just on studies of
terrorist organisations and activities, giving
instructions on border security and
analysing strategies dealing with the
aftermath of a terrorist attack. Thus the
centre will only provide basic training in
methods of identifying and tracking
terrorist groups rather being a centre in
which a joint regional strategy can be
formulated and intelligence efforts between
regional nations can be coordinated.
Meanwhile, Malaysia is funding the
centre alone because of its fears of
increasing anti-US-sentiment among the
majority of the Muslim Malay population.
But a totally Malaysian sponsored and
organised facility is clearly limiting its
usefulness and regional importance. Up
to now, there is still little active input,
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participation and contribution from other
ASEAN states. Therefore the centre can
not adequately assist the region for the
time being in formulating a real joint and
effective regional strategy against terrorism.
Another problem is that ASEAN
governments depend considerably on its
police forces and, to a less extent, its
immigration control agencies in fighting
terrorism. But they are both generally
overworked, underpaid, under trained and,
in some countries, prone to corruption.
Hence ASEAN counter-terrorist forces not
only have to monitor terrorists but also
some of their own police and immigration
officials _ a fact that also may deter regional
information sharing by other regional
countries.
On the positive side, however, this new
field of security cooperation for counter-
terrorist strategies on the regional and
interregional level between Southeast Asia
and Europe opens a wide range of
opportunities for the EU to assist and
support in the funding as well as training
of police forces and immigration officials,
and thus promote interregional cooperation
in anti-terrorist strategies in their own
strategic interests.
Conclusions and
Perspectives
The EU’s external relations have
become much more important as the result
of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties,
the creation of a CFSP in 1993, which has
been strengthened with an ESDP in 1999,
and the increasing importance of Justice
and Home Affairs for its relations with
other countries outside of Europe,
including Southeast Asia. Together with
ASEAN’s integration efforts for an ASEAN
Economic and Security Community, the
pre-conditions for a strengthened
interregional anti-terrorist strategy between
the EU and Southeast Asia have been
improved.
ASEAN and the ARF will continue to
be the major focus of EU’s political and
security dialogue with Southeast Asia. In
the future, it will become even more
important for the EU to play a proactive
role in the ARF in order to address and to
develop regional as well as interregional
strategies dealing effectively with the new
dimensions of the multi-dimensional
threats caused by international terrorist
groups. The progress in the interregional
political and security dialogue between the
EU and ASEAN depends, however, to a
considerable extent, on the intra-regional
integration processes on both sides, such
as ASEAN’s traditional non-intervention
clause and, therewith, on Southeast Asia’s
regional understanding of sovereignty in
the 21st century.
On the European side, after months of
internal dividing lines and lack of real
progress on the way to a real CFSP and
ESDP, the EU will adopt its first ever global
European Security Concept at the end of
the year. It will focus on increasing
interregional security cooperation in the
field of international terrorism,
proliferation of WMD as well as failed
states and organised crime. Although some
new forms of cooperation have already
been implemented, much more needs to
be done so that these new forms of
cooperation will become more effective
for both sides. The new discussions between
the EU and ASEAN should also include
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